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This paper examines the crisis management measures used by Mediterranean euro 
area countries and Hungary. Such a comparison is justified, because in certain periods 
of the crisis these countries faced similar challenges necessitating rapid economic 
policy intervention as previous practices proved to be unsustainable. However, the 
tools used – and thus also the results – were different. After 2010, Hungary sought 
to achieve economic balance by improving employment and growth, mainly driven 
by a tax reform and structural reforms of the budget and, from 2013, after the 
turnaround in monetary policy, also supported by targeted measures of the Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank (the Central Bank of Hungary). Overall, the harmonisation between 
the two main branches of economic policy gave rise to an innovative, growth-friendly 
economic policy, which since 2013 has created a balance between macro-financial 
equilibrium and growth not seen for a long time. By contrast, the Mediterranean 
countries using the euro basically opted for traditional crisis management: they 
sacrificed growth for balance, yet even the latter was achieved much later than in 
Hungary. In their case, recovery was also hampered by monetary policy constraints 
due to euro area membership. The targeted Hungarian steps may provide a good 
example to other countries facing similar challenges.
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1. Introduction
The global financial crisis posed an enormous challenge, primarily for those 
countries where economic growth had to be restored in parallel with fiscal and 
macro-financial stabilisation. Traditional crisis management tools are only able to 
*  The papers in this issue contain the views of the authors which are not necessarily the same as the official 
views of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
György Matolcsy is the Governor of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
Dániel Palotai is Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: palotaid@mnb.hu
The authors wish to thank Gergely Baksay, Ákos Szalai, Róbert Hausmann, Dávid Berta and Gábor Meizer for 
their contribution to this paper.
The Hungarian manuscript was received on 4 April 2018.
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25201/FER.17.2.542
Financial and Economic Review, Vol. 17 Issue 2, June 2018, pp. 5–42.
6 Studies
György Matolcsy – Dániel Palotai
achieve one of these goals, and only at the expense of the other. The introduction 
of a new model to Hungarian economic policy with innovative and targeted tools 
after 2010 resulted in effective crisis management in an international comparison, 
illustrating that with the appropriate approach, this crisis management dilemma can 
be resolved, and economic balance and growth can be achieved at the same time.
Ten years after the crisis, it is now time to draw the lessons. Economists are still 
reassessing and developing economic models by integrating previously neglected 
areas, such as the financial intermediary system, inequalities or the impact of the 
cyclical variation in fiscal multipliers. In a similar fashion, economic policymakers 
need to take stock of what they learned about crisis management and how to avoid 
a new crisis.
The study compares the Hungarian crisis management measures and results to 
the experiences of those European countries which, in many respects, faced similar 
policy challenges during the crisis. The comparison is based on the Mediterranean 
countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain: ClubMed), where – due to private sector 
or budgetary reasons – a similarly rapid economic policy intervention was necessary 
during the crisis, as the then prevailing practices had proved to be unsustainable.
The Mediterranean countries1 faced similar economic problems as Hungary. The 
financial crisis was especially severe in the countries that struggled with macro-
financial imbalances and financing difficulties, and whose room for economic policy 
manoeuvre was constrained. The pre-crisis situation was not exactly the same in 
all of the Mediterranean countries under review, but over time similar problems 
emerged, even though as euro area members they could rely on the support of the 
European Central Bank to some extent. The banking systems faced problems in all 
four countries, and large real estate bubbles formed, especially in Spain and Greece. 
Italy and Greece had the highest levels of public debt in the European Union (Sávai 
– Kiss 2017). Greece, Portugal and Spain were characterised by a current account 
deficit of around or over 10 per cent of GDP. The labour market participation rate 
and employment were substantially lower in Greece and Italy than the Western 
European average (Table 1).
1  The analysis needs to take into account the fact that these countries cannot be treated as a homogeneous 
group in every respect, as the source of macroeconomic instability as well as the tools chosen differed in 
a number of aspects.
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Table 1
Main macroeconomic indicators of Hungary and the ClubMed countries as an 
average of 2008–2010
Hungary Greece Italy Portugal Spain
Government debt (% 
of GDP)
76.5 127.4 110.1 83.8 50.8
Real GDP growth (%) –1.7 –3.4 –1.6 –0.3 –0.8
Average annual 
inflation (%)
4.9 3.4 2.0 1.1 2.0
Net external debt (% 
of GDP)
54.1 86.1 42.0 79.6 86.8
Budget balance (% of 
GDP)
–4.2 –12.2 –4.1 –8.3 –8.3
Unemployment rate 
(%)
9.7 10.0 7.6 10.5 16.4
Employment rate (%) 55.4 60.4 57.6 66.5 61.1
5-year CDS spread 
(bps)
272.3 311.8 139.5 114.7 112.1
Current account 
balance (% of GDP)
–2.5 –12.9 –2.7 –10.9 –5.8
Source: Eurostat, MNB
As a result of the flawed economic policy of 2002–2008, Hungary faced all of the 
problems characteristic of the Mediterranean countries at the onset of the crisis 
(Matolcsy 2008). Hungary had one of the lowest employment rates in the EU, a most 
severe factor inhibiting production, while also experiencing a persistently high general 
government deficit and current account deficit (twin deficit). The unsustainability of 
the Hungarian economic policy had been revealed earlier, already in 2006, and the 
lack of structural reforms as well as the flawed structure of the fiscal adjustment 
implemented at that time reduced the growth rate of the Hungarian economy to around 
0 even before the crisis. By the end of 2008, Hungary was characterised by weakened 
economic fundamentals and limited room for economic policy manoeuvre and was 
confronted with the global financial and economic depression, which resulted in a 
synchronised financing, debt and real economy crisis. As a consequence of the high 
external and internal indebtedness, the lack of market confidence and the freezing of 
the government securities market, Hungary was among the first countries which had 
to request financial assistance from the IMF and the European Union.
On account of the global financial crisis and the 2011 debt crisis in the peripheral 
countries, real economy output slumped, causing turmoil in the financial system 
and the functioning of money markets through various channels. As a general 
consequence, willingness to lend and to take risks declined, while the risk of 
the prolonged deflation emerged in the countries which were more affected by 
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the crisis. Meanwhile, government bond yields in certain euro area countries 
significantly surged, and due to the losses on government securities holdings on 
their balance sheets as well as non-performing loans, commercial banks curbed 
lending. In many places, the economic crisis was coupled with a political crisis, 
and finding the appropriate economic policy responses was also difficult because 
of frequent changes of government in some countries (after 2010, there were six 
different heads of government in Greece, and five in Italy).
After 2010, Hungary introduced growth-friendly fiscal reforms and, starting from 
2013, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) achieved a monetary policy turnaround 
with its innovative, targeted measures. As a result, the country’s crisis management 
proved to be more successful than in Mediterranean peers. By contrast, the 
Mediterranean countries sought to consolidate their budgets through traditional 
austerity measures, and their monetary policy was determined by the European 
Central Bank (ECB), which only belatedly used unconventional tools. We believe that 
the fiscal, employment and growth figures clearly show that the growth-friendly 
Hungarian crisis management model based on the harmony between fiscal and 
monetary policy was more effective than the traditional approach used in the 
Mediterranean countries. Reforms similar to those in Hungary would probably have 
reduced the growth sacrifice of stabilisation and thus borne fruit sooner in their 
case, too. The comparison should take into account the fact that the Hungarian 
measures have been based on strong political continuity and stability since 2010.
This paper highlights the differences in the crisis management practices of the 
Mediterranean countries and Hungary, and how effective they proved with respect 
to the achievement of the objectives. The second chapter presents the basic crisis 
management dilemma, i.e. that there is often a trade-off between stimulating 
economic growth and macro-financial stabilisation, and how this dilemma can be 
resolved. The third chapter lists the major fiscal measures, while the fourth details 
monetary policy steps. Both sections demonstrate that there were significant 
differences in the crisis management efforts. With respect to monetary policy, this 
was partly given for euro area members, since the use of a single currency does 
not allow autonomous crisis management, but the independence and room for 
manoeuvre of fiscal policy were very similar. Chapter 5 describes the results of 
the reforms, i.e. the macroeconomic situation achieved in recent years. Finally, 
Chapter 6 summarises the findings.
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2. The basic crisis management dilemma: balance or growth?
The largest challenge faced by the unstable countries during the crisis was to 
mitigate the recession and at the same time restore economic balance or, more 
concretely, reduce fiscal deficits. Countries with a stable macro-financial balance 
could afford to increase their budget deficit to cushion effects of the economic 
downturn (i.e. to pursue a countercyclical economic policy). This was typical for 
the advanced countries, while the Mediterranean countries also tried to adopt this 
approach (Figure 1). However, in 2010 euro area economies started focusing on 
improving the fiscal balance, neglecting the effects on the real economy, assuming 
that reducing the deficit does not materially affect economic growth. However, this 
assumption and the resulting procyclical fiscal policy proved to be one of the key 
mistakes in European crisis management.
Figure 1
Budget balance in Hungary and the Mediterranean countries, % of GDP
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Those countries applying austerity measures strongly underestimated fiscal 
multipliers in a recessionary environment. The fiscal multiplier measures the effect 
of a unit change in government expenditure or revenues on economic growth. 
However, among other factors, the size of the multiplier depends strongly on the 
cyclical position of the economy, and it is the strongest in times of recession (Ilzetzki 
et al. 2013; Auerbach – Gorodnichenko 2012). This means that in a crisis, the deficit-
reducing measures without economic stimulus elements hamper economic growth 
to such an extent that they undermine fiscal consolidation through the contraction 
of tax revenues.
Empirical evidence shows that the economic downturn was aggravated by fiscal 
austerity more than expected. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) concluded that the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the fiscal multiplier to be substantially 
lower than in reality, thereby also underestimating the recession caused by the 
fiscal adjustment. Their study showed that the larger the fiscal consolidation, the 
larger the shortfall in growth compared to the forecast. In Greece, for example, GDP 
growth in 2010–2011 was by 7 per cent lower than projected, while the budget 
balance was more or less in line with expectations. The authors estimated the fiscal 
multiplier to be between 0.9 and 1.7 and not around the level of 0.5 previously 
assumed by the IMF.
Without austerity measures, the recession could have been largely avoided, and a 
tax reform would have even boosted economic growth. House et al. (2017) modelled 
how much smaller the downturn would have been in the European Union Member 
States without austerity measures (raising taxes on labour, cutting wages and 
pensions). They found that without austerity measures, economic output could 
have fallen short of its potential level in the Mediterranean euro area countries 
(and Ireland) by a mere 1 per cent instead of the actual 18 per cent (Figure 2). The 
authors also point out in their paper that an independent monetary policy would 
have reduced the downturn by even more. The European Commission’s (2013) 
analysis also attests that a growth-friendly tax reform would have exerted a positive 
real economic impact in Spain and Italy.
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Between 2006 and 2009, i.e. in an earlier period than the Mediterranean countries, 
Hungary was characterised by austerity in fiscal policy that deepened the crisis. 
Between 2002 and 2006, the Hungarian budget deficit was at unsustainably high 
levels, at 7.9 per cent of GDP on average. The measures of 2006 aimed at reducing 
the deficit had a flawed structure, as they were solely based on raising tax revenues, 
and therefore their impact was similar to the subsequent austerity in Mediterranean 
countries (Matolcsy 2015). As a result of these measures, in 2007, i.e. the year 
before the crisis hit, economic growth already dropped to around 0 per cent, and it 
continued to stagnate below 1 per cent in 2008. The Hungarian budget responded 
to the real economy recession entailing the global financial crisis in 2009 with a 
different approach than most European countries. While elsewhere the recession 
was sought to be mitigated by increasing the deficit, the EU-IMF programmes 
imposed too tight fiscal measures on Hungary, which stood in stark contrast to the 
previous loose fiscal policy. This second wave of austerity-based fiscal consolidation 
focused on decreasing expenditures. International examples showed that in times of 
crisis, fiscal austerity curbs the economy’s performance and deepens the recession 
especially severely. Partly on account of this, the Hungarian economy saw one 
of the largest downturns in the European Union in 2009, when GDP declined by 
6.6 per cent. Overall, in 2006 and 2009 the Hungarian economy experienced what 
Figure 2
The combined economic performance of Mediterranean euro area countries and 
Ireland relative to the equilibrium with austerity measures (actual data) and without 
them (estimation)
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became reality in the Mediterranean countries only after 2009. The flawed timing 
and structure of fiscal austerity hampered growth and deepened the recession.
The new conservative Government that took office in 2010 performed a fiscal 
turnaround that reduced the deficit and stimulated economic growth at the same 
time. The Hungarian fiscal turnaround wished to solve the economic dilemma 
about the trade-off between economic balance and growth. The dilemma was 
resolved by the new Government by boosting employment, which not only led to 
economic growth but thus also to a larger tax base, improving the budget balance. 
The Government shifted the focus in tax centralisation from taxes on labour to 
consumption taxes, while also cutting the tax rates and simplifying the tax regime 
for Hungarian SMEs. On the expenditure side, fiscal balance was supported by 
the rationalisation of the loose social transfers that served as disincentives to 
employment (as part of the Széll Kálmán Plans). The details of the tax reform are 
presented in the next chapter where they are also contrasted with the measures 
in Mediterranean countries.
All in all, only Hungary managed to improve the budget balance and the dynamics 
of economic growth at the same time after 2010. Despite the average fiscal 
adjustment of around 9 per cent of GDP in the Mediterranean countries, their 
budget deficit was still over the 3 per cent Maastricht threshold in 2015. Meanwhile, 
the austerity measures also hampered the recovery. The real economy performance 
of Mediterranean countries continued to gradually deteriorate until 2013, and at 
the end of 2016, only Hungarian economic output was above the pre-crisis levels 
among the countries under review (Figure 19).
2.1. The Laffer curve
The Laffer curve illustrates the theory that there exists a tax rate that maximises 
government revenues under certain assumptions. However, a higher rate leads 
to lower tax revenues. The Laffer curve describes a non-linear relationship, first 
positive then negative, between the tax rate and the tax revenues realised.2
Beyond a point, high tax rates become particularly distortive for both the real 
economy and the budget. The reversal of the curve, i.e. when the relationship 
between the two variables turns from positive to negative, is based on the 
observation that an excessively high tax burden results in a smaller tax base on 
account of the negative dynamics that appear in such situations (e.g. diminishing 
labour supply, growing shadow economy). In case labour income is taxed excessively, 
the willingness to work declines in parallel with the drop in net wages. Depending 
on the tax rate, this drop may happen at either the intensive or the extensive 
2  The theory behind the Laffer curve was present before economist Arthur Laffer used it, but in the 1970s 
he advocated for the use of the theory in economic policy, pointing out the counterproductive effect of 
excessive taxation.
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margin of labour supply. And in case capital income is taxed excessively, companies’ 
willingness to invest falls on account of the expected decline in profitability.
The tax burden on economic actors is especially relevant in times of crisis. In an 
environment characterised by subdued demand or liquidity constraints, the fiscal 
multiplier is typically higher because economic actors are more sensitive to fiscal 
policy measures in the absence of financing. As a result, the excessive tax burden 
on income or a tax increase are especially detrimental to economic growth and 
the budgetary position due to the size of the tax base. Therefore growth-inducing 
measures, i.e. ones that reduce the tax burden, and a simultaneous budgetary 
consolidation is warranted to mitigate the crisis, and this stabilises the economy 
as well as the budget balance through the dynamic positive effects.
According to empirical experience, the Laffer curve peaks at around 50–60 per cent. 
Before the crisis, the Hungarian tax wedge is likely to have been in the declining 
part of the curve, however, it has been cut to a more favourable range. The shape 
(height, slope and skew) of the Laffer curve may vary between countries and 
periods, as it is substantially influenced by the given national economy’s tax regime, 
the functioning of the tax authority, the extent of tax evasion and the elasticity of 
taxable income. International experience shows that in the case of the taxes on 
labour, the curve peaks at a tax rate of around 50–60 per cent (Trabandt – Uhlig 
2012). In view of this, it is worth examining where Hungary was on the curve before 
2010 and where it is now. In 2009, the average Hungarian tax wedge was 53 per 
cent for the average wage, while the marginal tax wedge was over 70 per cent. The 
latter was between 75 and 80 per cent in the mid-2000s. By contrast, the average 
tax wedge has declined to 45 per cent; in fact, it is even lower (20–43 per cent) in 
the targeted groups (thanks to the introduction and expansion of the family tax base 
allowance and the Job Protection Action Plan). The lower tax rate for the targeted 
social groups (families with children and those who are more vulnerable on the 
labour market) is consistent with the government’s social policy objectives and 
priorities (improving demographic developments, full employment). The marginal 
tax wedge has equalled the average tax wedge since the introduction of the flat-rate 
personal income tax regime (Figure 3).
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3. Hungarian crisis management: economic balance and growth
After 2010, Hungarian fiscal policymakers chose an innovative, growth-friendly 
approach to crisis management (Matolcsy 2015; Kolozsi et al. 2017). The new 
economic policymakers soon realised that under these extraordinary circumstances 
only extraordinary, targeted and unconventional tools can achieve results. This is 
because the traditional fiscal policy built on austerity measures eliminates economic 
growth, especially in times of crisis (Eyraud – Weber 2013).
The main objective of the tax system reform was to develop a tax structure that 
ensures fiscal balance and supports economic growth. Achievement of these 
two goals in parallel hinged on boosting employment (Palotai 2017). The low 
employment rate was a structural problem in all of the economies under review, 
but high unemployment became an even more pressing social issue during the 
crisis. In the mid-2000s, the Hungarian participation and employment rates were 
the second lowest in the EU (at 61 and 57 per cent, respectively, on average in 
2003–2007), which was largely attributable to the high taxes on labour and the 
excessively loose social transfer system. This permanently damaged the Hungarian 
Figure 3
Illustrative Laffer curves based on international examples, and the Hungarian tax 
wedge in 2009 and 2018
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economy, as the availability of active labour in adequate quantity and quality is a 
cornerstone of competitiveness and successful convergence.
Raising the number of people in employment and reducing unemployment became a 
priority for Hungarian economic policy and the tax reform, and the most important 
tool for this was shifting the focus of the tax structure from taxes on labour towards 
consumption taxes (Figure 4) (Szoboszlai et al. 2018). Cutting the personal income tax 
rate not only encourages employment, this kind of tax shift also improves external 
competitiveness. This is because lowering the taxes on labour makes producing 
for export cheaper, while imports become more expensive due to higher value 
added taxes, which ultimately boosts the competitiveness of the national economy 
on export markets3 (OECD 2010; Prammer 2011). In addition to the tax shift, 
fiscal balance was ensured by sector-specific crisis taxes levied on more resilient 
service sectors (banking, insurance, energy, telecommunication and retail sectors). 
Also, the first steps were taken to improve the efficiency of tax collection, which 
culminated in parallel with the recovery. The structural transformation of the tax 
regime was implemented in 2010–2013 and was later followed by parametric fine- 
tuning.
3  This is the so-called fiscal devaluation.
Figure 4
Estimated static, cumulative fiscal impact of the Hungarian tax reforms after 2010 
by tax types
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3.1. Transformation of the taxes on labour
The most significant step in cutting the taxes on labour was the introduction of 
the flat-rate personal income tax regime, which reduced the single rate to below 
the former lowest rate. The elimination of progressivity in several stages (with 
a complete phase-out of tax credits and “super-grossing”)4 acknowledged and 
encouraged additional work and performance, i.e. it raised the effective labour 
supply of those already in the labour market (affecting the elasticity of labour supply 
at the intensive margin as well). It also reduced the willingness to conceal income 
on the part of both employees and employers.
One key targeted programme which strongly supported employment was the Job 
Protection Action Plan (JPAP), which bolstered the demand side of the labour market 
from 2013. The targeted employers’ contribution allowances introduced with the 
JPAP provide significant support to vulnerable groups in the labour market (those 
under 25 or over 55, mothers returning from maternity leave, the unskilled, the 
long-term unemployed and agricultural labourers). For the most targeted groups, 
the programme waived the full amount of the social contribution tax up to the first 
HUF 100,000 of monthly income, and half of it in the other groups. Employment 
increased overall but especially in the affected groups, by as much as 40 per cent 
since the introduction of the programme, and 900,000 workers in total benefit from 
the framework of allowances.
The introduction of the family tax base allowance (FTBA) is mainly a family policy 
measure for tackling long-term demographic challenges, but by nature it also helps 
to increase the labour supply. This is because the benefit paid for child(ren) is not 
universal, as it is conditional on the beneficiary parent having a reported, legal 
income tax base. Linking benefits to employment encourages active labour market 
participation and the reporting of undeclared income.
In the Mediterranean countries, the highly progressive structure of personal income 
tax was not transformed as in Hungary. Similar to Hungary, the Mediterranean 
countries also used a multi-rate, progressive personal income tax regime before the 
crisis: Greece had 3 brackets, Italy had 5, Portugal had 7, and Spain had 4. While 
the progressive nature of the Hungarian income tax regime was eliminated after 
4  Tax credits were universal tax allowances reducing personal income tax. The gradual phasing out of this 
allowance substantially raised the marginal tax wedge, which rose to over 60 per cent above the average 
wage in 2010, while the marginal tax rate was almost 70 per cent due to the reduction of tax credits to zero 
and the introduction of the upper bracket of personal income tax. The system of tax credits was completely 
eliminated in 2012, which contributed to the simplification of the personal income tax regime and the 
cutting of the marginal tax rate.
Super-grossing was a “hidden” form of raising the taxes on labour, because, instead of the income tax 
rates, the tax base was raised through administrative measures. The system expanded the personal income 
tax base by 27 per cent, amounting to the same percentage as employers’ social contributions in 2010, 
raising the average burden at all income levels uniformly. Super-grossing was introduced in 1 January 2010, 
and it was completely phased out by 2013 in two stages, contributing to the lowering of the taxes on 
labour.
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2010 and replaced with a flat-rate system fostering more proportional public burden 
sharing, Mediterranean countries retained the multi-rate, progressive personal 
income tax regime. After the crisis, Greece started using a system with 10 brackets, 
with Italy having 6, Portugal 7 and Spain 5 brackets, mainly on account of the 
introduction of special taxes. The amendments increased not only the progressivity 
and complexity of the system, but also the taxes on labour (Table 2).
Table 2
Personal income tax regimes in Hungary and the Mediterranean countries before 
the crisis (in 2007) and afterwards
Number of personal 
income tax rates and 
surtaxes
PIT rates before the crisis
PIT rates after the 
measures
Hungary 2+1 rates -> flat rate 18% and 36% + 4% 15%
Greece 3 rates -> 4+6 rates 29%–40% 22%–45% + 10% 
Italy 5 rates -> 5+1 rates 23%–43% 23%–43% + 3%
Portugal 7 rates -> 5+2 rates 10.5%–42%  14.5%–48% + 5%
Spain 4 rates -> 5 rates 24%–43% 19%–45%
Note: The + “x” percentages in the table show the special PITs. The special PITs marked after the measu-
res show the highest possible values.
Source: Edited based on OECD (2017) data
As a result of the Hungarian Government’s measures reducing taxes on labour, the 
marginal tax wedge (the tax burden on a unit of additional income) was lowered 
considerably after the crisis. By contrast, the tax rate on additional income stagnated 
or rose in the Mediterranean countries (Figure 5).
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The reduction in the personal income tax (PIT) after 2010 can also be clearly seen 
in the transformation of the tax structure. Before 2010, PIT revenues in Hungary 
amounted to around 18–19 per cent of all tax revenues, which puts them in the 
middle of the range of the Mediterranean countries. However, by 2011, the 
Hungarian figure had dropped to roughly 13 per cent and by 2016 it had fallen to 
around 12 per cent, making the share of Hungarian PIT revenues the lowest. By 
contrast, the PIT revenues of Mediterranean countries moved in the opposite 
direction, having stagnated or risen in the crisis. Among the countries under 
review, Italy relies especially heavily on personal income tax for financing the 
budget (Figure 6).
Figure 5
Marginal tax wedge for single childless employees earning the average wage in 
Hungary and the ClubMed countries
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3.2. Corporate taxes in Hungary and the Mediterranean countries
Hungarian economic policy also made significant steps in fostering employment and 
job creation as well as increasing corporate profitability and capital accumulation 
by reducing taxes on the country’s micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. The 
special support provided to the SME sector is warranted, among other things, by 
the fact that two-third of Hungarian workers are employed in this sector.
In 2010, the Government already substantially expanded the group of SMEs eligible 
for a preferential corporate tax rate. In the second half of 2010 the eligibility 
criterion for the 10 per cent preferential tax rate was increased from HUF 50 million 
to HUF 500 million in revenues (those above this limit were taxed at a rate of 19 per 
cent), which considerably expanded the group of firms paying the low corporate tax 
rate. In 2017, the corporate tax rate was reduced uniformly to 9 per cent, making 
it the lowest corporate tax in the EU. While the 2010 measure mainly provided a 
substantial tax relief to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, the 2017 tax cut 
Figure 6
Personal income tax revenues in Hungary and the Mediterranean countries (as a 
percentage of total tax revenue)
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principally supports the ability to raise capital and corporations’ competitiveness 
(Mosberger 2017).
Just as in the case of the personal income tax, the Mediterranean countries also 
missed the opportunity to significantly lower corporate taxes during the crisis (Figure 
7). In Portugal, the average pre-crisis tax rate of 26.5 per cent had risen to around 
30 per cent by the end of the crisis. In the same period in Greece, the corporate 
tax was raised from 25 to 29 per cent. In the other two Mediterranean countries 
under review, Spain, and Italy, the corporate tax rate dropped somewhat, but still 
remained high (25 per cent in Spain and 27.8 per cent in Italy).
The 2013 introduction of two important, targeted forms of taxation, the small 
taxpayers’ itemised lump sum tax (KATA) and the small enterprise tax (KIVA) further 
reduced and simplified the tax burden on the Hungarian SME sector’s capital income. 
These targeted small enterprise taxes have become more and more popular, since 
with these taxpayers can pay taxes in a simplified manner with less administration 
and lower rates, as they replace several other reporting and payment obligations 
at the same time. The small taxpayers’ itemised lump sum tax is especially simple, 
as it offers a fixed-rate tax to the smallest companies (HUF 50,000 per month up 
to an annual income of HUF 12 million when the taxpayer works full time). By 
Figure 7
Corporate income tax (CIT) regimes in Hungary and the Mediterranean countries 
before the crisis (in 2007) and afterwards
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paying the KATA, taxpayers are exempt from corporate personal income tax, the 
corporate tax, the dividend tax or lump sum tax, the personal income tax, the 
personal contributions, the healthcare contribution, the social contribution tax 
as well as the vocational training contribution, i.e. the administrative burden is 
significantly reduced. The other new tax type, the so-called small enterprise tax 
was designed for slightly larger companies, and, with its current 13 per cent rate 
instead of the 16 per cent upon introduction, it replaces three traditional taxes: 
the corporate tax, the employers’ social contribution (social contribution tax) and 
the vocational training contribution.
Thanks to the measures, capital taxes were lowered in Hungary, leaving more 
income for businesses to invest and increase their headcount. Both before and after 
the global crisis, the share of capital taxes relative to GDP was lower in Hungary 
than in the Mediterranean countries. In 2010, taxes on capital income were lowered 
in Hungary, while Mediterranean countries’ capital taxes relative to GDP gradually 
increased (Figure 8).
Figure 8
Capital taxes relative to GDP in Hungary and the Mediterranean countries
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3.3. Consumption taxes and sectoral taxes for achieving fiscal balance
Hungary required additional budgetary resources to finance the measures fostering 
employment and growth, as the first few years of reforms typically entail lower 
budgetary benefits than costs. There were three possible options for compensating 
for the lost budgetary revenues: 
•   introduction of traditional austerity measures; 
•   high deficit, growing external indebtedness; 
•   increasing consumption taxes and using alternative, innovative tools (sectoral 
taxes).
Running a high deficit or introducing austerity measures go against the objectives of 
the economic policy pursued after 2010, aimed at improving economic balance and 
stimulating the economy. Therefore, the additional space for fiscal manoeuvre was 
created by raising consumption taxes and introducing sectoral taxes. Consumption 
taxes distort economic actors’ savings and investment decisions to a lesser extent, 
and they have an adequately broad tax base, as they also involve into tax paying 
those who are not formally employed in the labour market (European Commission 
2011). The use of sectoral taxes was warranted because well capitalised sectors with 
lower effective tax rates (banking sector, energy sector, retail sector) were much 
more resilient than households and thus better fit to bear the additional tax burden. 
Lowering households’ disposable income would have been counterproductive in 
the crisis years due to the high fiscal multiplier, as was shown by the example of 
the Mediterranean countries.
The increase in consumption taxes significantly shifted the Hungarian tax structure 
towards consumption taxes (Figure 9). The most important step was increasing the 
VAT rate from 25 to 27 per cent. The growing proportion of consumption taxes was 
also influenced by the fact that the sectoral taxes has been largely phased out from 
2013, to be replaced by new consumption and turnover-type taxes (e.g. insurance 
tax, telecommunications tax, financial transaction tax).5
5  Eurostat lists the special taxes, such as the financial transaction tax, the advertising tax, the accident tax, the 
insurance tax, the telecommunications tax and the public health product tax, among consumption taxes.
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Tax revenues were increased without raising the tax rates, by the effective steps 
taken to reduce tax evasion. The most important measure against shadow economy 
was the establishment of an online link between the retail sector’s cash registers 
and the tax authority in several stages. As a result, there were more than 200,000 
controlled cash registers in operation by 2016 (Szalai – Kolozsi 2016). Another factor 
that contributed to combating the shadow economy was the introduction of the 
Electronic Trade and Transport Control System (EKÁER)6 as well as the use of the 
reverse charge on VAT in several areas. Due to these measures, the Hungarian 
shadow economy diminished significantly after 2013. According to the European 
Commission’s calculations, the Hungarian VAT gap7 dropped from 21 to 14 per cent 
between 2013 and 2015 (European Commission 2017). Furthermore, estimates 
about the effective VAT rate calculated as the tax revenues divided by the estimated 
tax base also show that the shadow economy is shrinking. The effective rate rose 
by over 2 percentage points between 2013 and 2015 without any change in the 
VAT rates (Figure 10).
6  The EKÁER is a government infrastructure aimed at reducing the shadow economy in Hungarian transport 
activities and increasing food safety, which was developed in harmony with the Széll Kálmán Plan, and which 
started functioning on 1 January 2015. Transport data need to be recorded in a central electronic system 
before transportation, which strengthens the position of law-abiding market participants, the transparency 
of the trade in goods and facilitates the identification of tax evaders.
7  One tool for measuring the shadow economy is the calculation of the VAT gap, which is the difference 
between the potential and actually collected VAT revenues.
Figure 9
Consumption tax revenues in Hungary and the Mediterranean countries (as a 
percentage of total tax revenue)
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3.4. Structural reforms versus austerity measures
Hungary and the Mediterranean countries also chose different paths in terms of 
transforming budgetary expenditures. The traditional method of stabilising the 
budget is to cut spending. In a crisis, when fiscal austerity affects the economy 
especially strongly due to the general lack of demand and funds, such measures 
point towards deepening the recession. If the demand of the private sector is not 
strong enough to offset the fall in government demand, the recession continues to 
deepen. Therefore, expenditure cuts need to be coupled with structural reforms, 
which result in the more efficient utilisation of expenditures and resources.
Hungary linked the reduction in budgetary spending to competitiveness reforms 
stimulating the labour market. Before 2010, the unreasonably loose social transfer 
system resulted in high budgetary expenditures and low labour market participation 
rates. The targeted reforms of the Széll Kálmán Plans reduced spending and 
also increased labour market participation. The rules for early retirement were 
significantly tightened, the eligibility criteria for disability pensions were reviewed, 
and both the maximum duration and transfer amounts of unemployment benefits 
were cut. As a result, Hungary managed to substantially lower the number of 
people receiving early retirement benefits (Figure 11), while the participation rate 
increased, which increased the labour supply and the number of workers waiting 
until old-age retirement and contributed to the stabilisation of the budget balance. 
Figure 10
Developments in the effective VAT rate and the underlying causes of its changes in 
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The private pension fund reform not only helped to stabilise the budget, but also 
eliminated a wasteful, low-efficiency system. The funds invested a large portion of 
their guaranteed inflows in government securities, which financed the mounting 
debt exactly because of the contribution revenues foregone in favour of the funds 
(Banai – Palotai 2018). The sector was characterised by weak competition and high 
operating costs, which increased the budget deficit by 1–1.5 percentage points 
every year. The elimination of the compulsory private pension fund membership 
and the preference of the option of returning to the state system contributed 
significantly to bringing down the budget deficit to below 3 per cent and placing 
the government debt on a steadily downward path.
The Government spent a portion of the savings from the structural reforms on 
expanding and developing the public work programme. Economic policymakers 
wished to provide “work instead of benefits” even to those who had previously been 
inactive, creating an opportunity to return to the labour market. The programme is 
by nature temporary in the sense that it does not aim to tie down labour in this form 
for a long time: the number of participants has been gradually declining since 2016. 
It aims at offering an opportunity to participate on the primary labour market (the 
share of which has been gradually increasing, as the number of public workers has 
dropped from around 220,000 to below 160,000, meanwhile the participation rate 
jumped while the unemployment rate fell). It is also an effective tool for cushioning 
the effects of the economy’s cyclical fluctuations exerted on the labour market and 
Figure 11
Number of people receiving early retirement benefits and budgetary expenditures 
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reducing hysteresis. On account of the reforms, participation and employment have 
increased spectacularly, while the unemployment rate have fallen to among the 
lowest in the European Union (3.9 per cent) by early 2018.
Instead of targeted reforms, the Mediterranean countries sought to balance the 
budget through austerity measures, but this entailed huge growth sacrifices. In 
Portugal in 2011, public sector  wages were reduced by 5 per cent on average and 
pensions were frozen. In 2013, pensions were reduced in a progressive system, and 
public sector wages declined further (also in a progressive system). Meanwhile, 
the number of public sector employees dropped by 10 per cent between 2011 
and 2014. In Spain, pensions were frozen in 2011. In parallel with this, the number 
of public sector employees fell by 375,000 between 2011 Q3 and 2013 Q1. In 
Greece, in addition to the cuts in public sector wages, pensions over EUR 1,000 
were reduced in 2011, then the 13th and 14th monthly pensions were completely 
abolished in 2012. In 2013, 15,000 public sector jobs were terminated. The following 
year, public sector wages and pensions were frozen for another four years.
All in all, the Mediterranean countries chose the traditional path of fiscal 
consolidation, while Hungary undertook structural reforms. Although in the first 
years of the crisis, similar to others in the EU, the ClubMed countries loosened their 
fiscal policy, this seemed to be unsustainable due to the previously accumulated 
imbalances, and therefore they were forced to rethink their economic policies 
after 2010. Based on the recommendations by international organisations, the 
Mediterranean countries started a major fiscal tightening without domestic reforms, 
which – similar to the crisis management efforts in Hungary in 2008–2009 – curbed 
GDP, i.e. deepened the recession, even more than expected.
The Hungarian fiscal turnaround could be, and turned out to be, successful because 
it stimulated growth and employment, while also broadening the tax base. One of 
the cornerstones of the domestic reforms was shifting the focus of tax centralisation 
from the taxes on labour towards consumption taxes. The goal was to vitalise both 
the supply and the demand side of the labour market and to combat the shadow 
economy. In addition to supporting employment and families, the Government 
also fostered the profitability of the SME sector by reducing the corporate tax 
in several steps as well as by developing simplified, preferential small enterprise 
taxes. The achievement of fiscal balance was aided by higher consumption taxes 
and the larger tax burden (sector taxes) on the sectors with greater social resilience 
(banking, energy, telecommunication and retail). Fiscal balance was supported by 
further measures aimed at reducing the shadow economy (e.g. the introduction of 
online cash registers and the EKÁER) from the revenue side, and by the structural 
reforms included the rationalisation of early retirement and disability retirement 
(Széll Kálmán Plans) from the expenditure side.
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4. Different monetary policies in Hungary and the euro area
Hungary and the Mediterranean region of the euro area faced the crisis with 
strikingly different monetary policy frameworks, which to a great degree determined 
the possibility of consistency between fiscal and monetary policy, which became 
key for crisis management. As the fiscal rules represented a strict constraint 
on stimulating the economy, the role of monetary policy has gained in relative 
importance in recent years. While the single monetary policy of euro area countries 
is determined by the European Central Bank, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank can conduct 
autonomous and, when necessary, effectively targeted monetary policy in Hungary. 
The fixed exchange rate regime required autonomous central bank objectives and 
the free choice of tools to be given up, which narrowed economic policymakers’ 
room for manoeuvre. Moreover, these economies generated no inflation through 
their fiscal policies either which without the appropriate easing of monetary 
conditions led to the emergence of a strongly disinflationary and then deflationary 
environment in this region, with the risk of a vicious deflationary spiral (Figure 12).
Figure 12
Average annual inflation in Hungary and the euro area Mediterranean countries
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The autonomous monetary policy enabled Hungary to develop a constructive 
consistency between fiscal policy and central bank policy. However, this could only 
be achieved in 2013, when the new central bank leaders took office. From 2013, the 
MNB started introducing innovative programmes fostering stability and economic 
growth, and therefore Hungary’s crisis management could be more effective than 
the Mediterranean model. The MNB has supported the total economy through 
the interest rate cutting cycles, the Funding for Growth Scheme (FGS) stimulating 
corporate lending and investments, the Growth Supporting Programme, the Self-
Financing Programme reducing the macro-financial vulnerability of the country as 
well as the forint conversion of household FX loans conducted in cooperation with 
the Government.
4.1. Monetary policy turnaround and targeted measures in Hungary
Budgetary stabilisation and the independent monetary policy paved the way for 
a monetary policy turnaround in Hungary after 2013, which was based on the 
significant reduction of the policy rate and targeted measures.
The lower policy rate reduced the interest burden in all sectors of the economy while 
also supporting investments and consumption. Low inflation and the improving risk 
perception of the economy after the fiscal consolidation provided ample room for 
manoeuvre for the Magyar Nemzeti Bank to create steadily favourable monetary 
conditions actively supporting growth. The first and traditional tool for this was the 
prudent and gradual decrease of the central bank base rate from 7 per cent to the 
historic low of 0.9 per cent between 2012 (i.e. from the interest rate cuts launched 
with the support of the then new external members of the MNB Monetary Council) 
and 2016 (Figure 13). Government securities yields followed the development of 
the base rate in the context of low inflation, the favourable international money 
market environment and Hungary’s improving risk perception, which showed that 
investors also considered monetary policy sound and credible. The falling yields 
considerably reduced the government’s interest expenses. Total savings have 
amounted to 4.5 per cent of GDP since 2013 (HUF 1,600 billion).
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The Funding for Growth Scheme and later the Growth Supporting Programme 
were targeted tools supporting the SME sector that helped avoid the risk of a 
creditless recovery. Similar to some foreign central banks, in addition to the general, 
traditional tools, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank used targeted, unconventional measures 
to effectively address the unprecedented money market and real economy crisis. 
Such measures included the MNB’s Funding for Growth Scheme announced in 
the spring of 2013, which sought to alleviate commercial banks’ insufficient SME 
lending. This was necessary because there was a real danger of the credit market 
(which had contracted by around 6 per cent annually since mid-2009) freezing 
completely, which would have entailed a persistent growth sacrifice and also 
undermined potential growth. To address this issue, the MNB offered refinancing 
loans to the commercial bank sector at 0 per cent, which had to be lent to the SME 
sector with a premium of up to 2.5 per cent (for fixed capital formation, working 
capital acquisition, FX loan refinancing and prefinancing EU funds). Within the 
framework of the programme, around 40,000 SMEs obtained preferential loans 
amounting to HUF 2,800 billion (8 per cent of GDP) in total. Thanks to the success 
of the FGS and the Growth Supporting Programme (GSP) introduced in 2016, which 
aimed to gradually phase out the FGS and smoothly shift corporate lending to 
market financing, the contraction in credit was reversed, and by the end of 2016, 
SME lending had started increasing dynamically (Figure 14).
Figure 13
Central bank base rate in Hungary
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According to Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2016) estimates, the rate-cutting cycles and the 
central bank programmes fostering lending activity contributed to around half of 
the economic growth in recent years, directly and indirectly, and they also exerted 
a positive impact on potential growth.
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s Self-Financing Programme aimed to reduce the external 
vulnerability of the economy. The Self-Financing Programme was introduced by 
the central bank in mid-2014 and was then expanded in 2015 and 2016 in several 
stages. The primary goal of the programme was to reduce external vulnerability and 
improve the risk perception of the total economy, and to mitigate the central bank’s 
FX reserve requirements by lowering external financing and expanding the domestic 
investor base. Therefore, the MNB encouraged commercial banks to keep their 
liquid assets in securities rather than in the central bank's sterilisation instrument. 
During the programme, the central bank policy instrument was transformed from 
a two-week bond into a three-month deposit, which considerably reduced its 
liquidity. Furthermore, the conditional central bank interest rate swap (IRS) was 
temporarily introduced to mitigate the interest rate risk of commercial banks arising 
from purchasing long-term, fixed-rate securities (Magyar Nemzeti Bank 2015). 
Figure 14
Growth rate of loans outstanding of the whole corporate sector and the SME sector 
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The programme contributed substantially to enhancing the financing structure 
of government debt as well as to lower exchange rate exposure via a significant 
reduction in the share of foreign ownership and the foreign currency ratio in debt. 
After the extremely high figures at the end of 2011, both ratios are currently at 
historic lows (Figure 15).
The phase-out of households’ FX mortgages in cooperation with the Government 
and the banking sector saved the country from an economic and social catastrophe. 
As a result of the widespread, large-scale FX-denominated lending from 2003, 
by the time the 2008 global crisis hit, a large portion of the private sector had 
become indebted in foreign currency, which entailed a huge systemic risk even by 
international standards, due to the significant exchange rate exposure (Figure 16). 
This is because on account of the considerable weakening of the forint due to the 
crisis, the monthly payments of the debtors increased dramatically, making housing 
conditions uncertain for hundreds of thousands of people. In parallel with this, the 
rising payments also stymied aggregate demand, as they reduced the disposable 
income and consumption of debtors and drastically increased the ratio of non-
performing loans (NPLs) (4–6-fold) in the banking sector, which jeopardised the 
Figure 15
Foreign ownership and foreign currency ratio of the Hungarian central government 
debt
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
Per cent  Per cent
20
05
Q
1 
20
05
Q
4 
20
06
Q
3 
20
07
Q
2 
20
08
Q
1 
20
08
Q
4 
20
09
Q
3 
20
10
Q
2 
20
11
Q
1 
20
11
Q
4 
20
12
Q
3 
20
13
Q
2 
20
14
Q
1 
20
14
Q
4 
20
15
Q
3 
20
16
Q
2 
20
17
Q
1 
20
17
Q
4 
Share of FX-denominated debt in public debt 
Share of external debt in public debt 
Source: MNB, Government Debt Management Agency
32 Studies
György Matolcsy – Dániel Palotai
stability of the financial system. Meanwhile, the widespread FX lending impaired the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism, as Hungarian monetary policy could not 
influence the interest rates on the loans denominated in foreign currency. It became 
crucial for society and for economic policymakers to phase out the FX-denominated 
loans as soon as possible, but only the Government that came to power in 2010 
was determined to go that far.
Since 2013, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank has helped with all its available means in 
settling the matter of households' FX loans. Before the Supreme Court's (Curia) 
uniformity decision in mid-2014, the MNB played a proactive role in the negotiations 
between the Government and the Banking Association, and then contributed 
significantly to the successful forint conversion of household FX loans by providing 
the necessary liquidity (EUR 9 billion) to the banking sector (Kolozsi et al. 2015). To 
ensure the success of forint conversion and prevent money market speculation, the 
conversion rate had to be fixed in advance and without informing market actors, 
which required close cooperation from the three players, the Government, the 
Central Bank and the Banking Association (Nagy 2015). FX loans started to be 
converted in the autumn of 2014 with the announcement of the FX tenders linked 
to the phase-out of household mortgages, and they were followed by personal and 
car loans in 2015, therefore by the end of 2015 Hungarian households basically 
had no FX loans on their balance sheets. The average monthly instalments on the 
previously Swiss franc-denominated housing loans plummeted by 25 per cent. 
Figure 16
Household sector housing loans borrowed from credit institutions in Hungary (as a 
percentage of GDP)
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The importance of these measures was later underlined by the fact that all this 
was achieved before the Swiss National Bank discontinued the use of its exchange 
rate floor against the euro, after to which the appreciation of the Swiss franc would 
have had unpredictable consequences.
4.2. The European Central Bank’s crisis management was insufficient for the 
ClubMed countries
The single monetary policy of the euro area practically gives no possibility to apply 
targeted central bank measures at the national economy level. This would be 
appropriate if the euro area were an optimum currency area, but the crisis has 
shown that this is not the case. The conditions for joining the euro area, i.e. the so-
called Maastricht criteria, focus entirely on the financial stability of the economy, or 
more precisely on certain segments of that (inflation, yields, exchange rate stability, 
general government). However, we believe that the successful functioning of the 
currency area has further conditions. Nagy and Virág (2017) summarised these 
as follows: (i) real convergence, (ii) harmonisation of business cycles, (iii) similar 
levels of competitiveness, (iv) adequate financial sector, (v) available countercyclical 
policies. However, the euro area is characterised by considerable differences in 
these factors. Peripheral countries typically faced larger deflationary risks and 
higher unemployment rates. The economic situation and structure of northern and 
southern countries was different even at the time of their euro adoption and the 
crisis only amplified the differences. The euro area does not allow nominal exchange 
rate adjustment, but has not ruled out the possibility of huge real exchange rate 
differences emerging among its members. One of the main drivers behind the 
emergence of real exchange rate differences was divergent wage dynamics (Sapir 
2016).
The European Central Bank only belatedly used unconventional instruments, which 
deepened the crisis in several Member States. The ECB responded to the crisis with 
rapid interest rate cuts, but it used other monetary policy instruments only belatedly 
(Matolcsy 2015), which kept monetary conditions relatively tight8. While managing 
the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB's measures aimed to reduce bond market 
spreads and restore the transmission mechanism to avoid defaults in peripheral 
countries. The ECB launched the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) in 2010, 
seeking to lower the excessive spreads by purchasing the government bonds from 
Mediterranean countries. Due to its size, the programme was only able to halt 
the rise in spreads and was unable to achieve a permanent drop in yields. The 
persistence of high yields in peripheral countries contributed to the unsustainably 
high levels of government debt and that these economies required external 
financing. The bonds purchased in the course of the programme amounted to 
8  This was exacerbated by the fact that the ECB attempted to launch the tightening cycle too early, in 2011.
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EUR 217 billion, which proved to be insufficient with respect to the affected 
Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Greek and Irish papers in the long run (Lehmann – 
Mátrai – Pulai 2013). The programme was not transparent, since the ECB did not 
communicate its purchases and their individual amounts, only the total holdings, 
and therefore no information could be obtained on the purchased amounts by 
country. The difference in market reactions is clearly shown by the fact that after 
President Mario Draghi’s “Whatever it takes” speech and the announcement of the 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, the Mediterranean country 
yields started rapidly converging to core euro area yields. The two instruments 
differed in their amount, as one of the main messages of the OMT was that there 
was no upper limit on the planned purchases. The ECB repeatedly mentioned in 
its communication that these countries needed structural reforms and an overhaul 
of their fiscal policy. Yet one might still wonder whether it was worth waiting with 
an OMT-type measure until 2012. Demertzis and Wolff (2016) argue that the size 
of the first asset purchases relative to GDP was miscalculated, and the ECB only 
corrected this in 2016.9
All in all, due to the deepening debt crisis and the restrained monetary policy, not 
even the main objective, i.e. the inflation target, could be achieved in the euro area 
(Demertzis – Wolff 2016). The gradually introduced and expanded unconventional 
instruments helped stimulate the economy but their effect proved to be insufficient.
5. Success of the Hungarian reforms in view of Mediterranean 
countries’ experiences
The different crisis management tools led to different results in the Mediterranean 
region and Hungary.10 In contrast to the traditional crisis management logic, 
Hungary managed to stabilise the budget and restore economic growth sooner than 
Mediterranean countries. We believe that this was mainly due to the success of the 
employment policy turnaround, which was also heavily influenced by the economic 
policies supporting corporate investments. In contrast to the Hungarian measures, 
the adjustments in Southern Europe had a drastic effect on employment and also 
capital accumulation, which exerted a negative impact on both aggregate demand 
and long-term growth. Between 2007 and 2013, Hungary’s investment ratio relative 
to GDP dropped by less than 3 percentage points (from 24 to 21 per cent), while 
the same figure in ClubMed countries decreased by over 9 percentage points on 
average (from 25 to 16 per cent). The indicator was then characterised by stagnation 
and moderate growth until 2017 in all countries. Only Hungary managed to exceed 
9  The comprehensive analysis of the European Central Bank’s crisis management is beyond the scope of this 
paper. For more information on this, see Chapter 4 of Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2017).
10  The figures in this chapter were based on György Matolcsy’s presentation at the opening plenary session 
of the 2017 Annual Congress of Economists of the Hungarian Economic Association (Matolcsy 2017).
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the 2010 level by 2017 (21.5 per cent), while the Mediterranean countries remain 
below that with 16.7 per cent on average.
In line with the intentions of Hungarian economic policymakers, the economy 
practically reached full employment by 2018. The number of people in employment 
grew by roughly 20 per cent between 2010 and 2017 (from 3.7 million to 
4.4 million), with the employment rate rising from 55 to 68 per cent. The Hungarian 
employment rate showed the second largest improvement in the EU, catching up 
with the average of not only the EU but also the country’s Visegrád peers, and 
surpassing Mediterranean euro area members. In the case of Mediterranean 
countries, serious structural problems might be behind the fact that they still have 
not come close to their pre-crisis position with respect to the employment rate 
(Figure 17). An even more telling sign is that the Hungarian unemployment rate sank 
to an unprecedented low, 3.9 per cent, in early 2018. By contrast, in Mediterranean 
countries the 6–9 per cent characteristic in the pre-crisis period was not achieved 
by any of the economies (Figure 18).
Figure 17
Annual average employment rate in Hungary and the Mediterranean countries 
(among 15–64-year-olds)
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The expansion of employment laid the foundations of economic growth in Hungary, 
while the Mediterranean countries’ GDP still fell short of the pre-crisis level in 2016 
(Figure 19). Hungarian GDP expanded by almost 17 per cent between the 2009 
recession and 2017, which is 11 per cent higher than the pre-crisis level in 2007. 
Since 2013, the growth rate of the Hungarian economy has been significantly higher 
than the EU average, and, in contrast to the pre-crisis period, it is on par with the 
average growth in the Visegrád region. By contrast, the difficult recovery of the 
Mediterranean region is illustrated by the fact that with the exception of Spain, 
the ClubMed countries still have not been able to reach the 2007 level. Greece has 
suffered a 25 per cent setback in growth that it has not been able to offset since 
2013.
Figure 18
Annual average unemployment rate in Hungary and the Mediterranean countries
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After 2010, Hungary was able to create room for manoeuvre for the implementation 
of reform steps through the tax reform while ensuring fiscal balance. Since 2011, the 
Hungarian deficit-to-GDP ratio has been consistently below the European Union’s 
3 per cent Maastricht criterion. By contrast, most Mediterranean countries were 
able to meet the EU’s deficit criterion only in 2016 (Figure 1). The 2010–2013 tax 
reform exerted its economic stimulus effect and thus padded budget revenues 
gradually, therefore tax revenues in Hungary increased by almost 2 per cent of GDP 
between 2014 and 2016 without raising the tax rates (Palotai 2017).
In Hungary, the previously upward trend in the government debt ratio was halted 
by the growth-friendly fiscal consolidation from 2011 (Matolcsy – Palotai 2016). 
The gross debt-to-GDP ratio fell from its historic peak of 80.5 per cent in 2011 to 
73.6 per cent by the end of 2017. Hungary achieved the fifth largest debt reduction 
in the EU between 2010 and 2017 (the debt ratio decreased in 10 countries and 
increased in all the rest). By contrast, the government debt of Mediterranean euro 
area countries have been stagnating at the high level seen after the 2008 crisis 
(Figure 20).
Figure 19
Cumulative real GDP growth in Hungary and the Mediterranean countries
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6. Summary
The new model in Hungarian economic policy introduced after 2010 which used 
innovative and targeted tools resulted in an effective crisis management in an 
international comparison. It has been ten years since the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis, and thus it is now possible to take stock of the crisis management 
efforts of Hungary and compare them to the results by other countries.
Despite the similar initial situation, the Mediterranean countries and Hungary chose 
different ways in almost all aspects of crisis management (Figure 21). The ClubMed 
economies under review have been part of the euro area, and therefore they could 
not conduct autonomous monetary policy. Moreover, they chose to address the 
fiscal challenges by taking the traditional route of cutting expenditures and raising 
taxes (to adjust their formerly unsustainably loose fiscal stance). By contrast, 
Hungary undertook a tax reform instead of raising taxes, and spent the fiscal savings 
on fostering employment. The fiscal reforms after 2010 were also supported by the 
monetary policy turnaround of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank in 2013, creating a vital 
and close coordination between the two main branches of economic policy (Lentner 
2017). In addition to the interest rate cuts aiming at reaching the inflation target, 
SME lending, financial stability and the reduction of external indebtedness were 
Figure 20
Gross debt-to-GDP ratio in Hungary and the Mediterranean euro area countries
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supported by innovative, targeted measures. These structural changes paved the 
way for sustainable economic growth. Nonetheless, in order to ensure successful 
convergence, the focus should shift to further improving the qualitative (i.e. non-
price) competitiveness of the economy.
In contrast to the successful stabilisation in Hungary based on targeted, structural 
reforms, the crisis management of the Mediterranean euro area countries proved 
to be unsuccessful. This was mainly attributable to fiscal austerity, and the lack of 
structural reforms and an autonomous, targeted and efficient monetary policy. 
The belated and inefficient monetary crisis management and the traditional fiscal 
crisis management based on austerity measures entailed enormous real economy 
sacrifices, which led to a vicious cycle in the economy. As a result, the Mediterranean 
countries still struggle with growth and labour market conditions worse than before 
the crisis and high and stagnating government debt levels. We believe that if during 
the crisis the ClubMed countries had undertaken reforms similar to the Hungarian 
way after 2010, they would have been able to achieve fiscal stability and labour 
market consolidation sooner and with a smaller growth sacrifice.
References
Auerbach, A.J. – Gorodnichenko, Y. (2012): Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy. 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(2): 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.4.2.1 
Banai, P.B. – Palotai, D. (2018): Fenntartható költségvetés – fenntartható nyugdíjrendszer 
(Sustainable budget – sustainable pension system). Világgazdaság, 8 February. 
Blanchard, O. – Leigh, D. (2013): Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers. IMF working 
paper. 
Figure 21
The vicious cycle of traditional crisis management and the successful Hungarian 
crisis management
Vicious cycle of ClubMed countries
Austerity measures
Lack of revenues
Higher deﬁcit Slowdown ofeconomic growth
Tax reforms (Széll Kálmán plans)
Recovering economy
Increasing activity Budgetary stabilization
Hungarian crisis management
Source: MNB
40 Studies
György Matolcsy – Dániel Palotai
Lentner, Cs. (2017): Scientific Taxonomy of Hungarian Public Finances After 2010. Civic 
Review, 13 (Special Issue): 21–38. https://doi.org/10.24307/psz.2017.0303 
Demertzis, M. – Wolff, G.B. (2016): The effectiveness of the European Central Bank asset 
purchase programme. Bruegel Institute, May.
European Commission (2011): Tax reforms in EU Member States. http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/ee-2011-5_en.pdf 
European Commission (2013): Study on the impacts of fiscal devaluation. Taxation papers, 
Working paper No. 36.
European Commission (2017): Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member 
States. 2017 Final Report. https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/
study_and_reports_on_the_vat_gap_2017.pdf
Eyraud, L. – Weber, A. (2013): The Challenge of Debt Reduction during Fiscal Consolidation. 
IMF Working Paper, 13/67. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475553864.001 
House, C. – Proebsting, C. – Tesar, L. (2017): Austerity in the Aftermath of the Great Recession. 
NBER Working Papers Series No. 23147. https://doi.org/10.3386/w23147 
Ilzetzki, E. – Mendoza, E.G.– Végh, C.A. (2013): How Big (Small?) are Fiscal Multipliers? Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 60(2): 239–254. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.10.011 
Kolozsi, P.P. – Banai, Á. – Vonnák, B. (2015): Phasing out household foreign currency loans: 
schedule and framework. Financial and Economic Review 14(3): 60–87. http://english.
hitelintezetiszemle.hu/letoltes/3-kolozsi-banai-vonnak-en.pdf
Kolozsi, P.P. – Lentner, Cs. – Parragh, B. (2017): Közpénzügyi megújulás és állami 
modellváltás Magyarországon (Revised public finances and a new governmental model 
in Hungary). Polgári Szemle, 13(4–6): 28–51. https://polgariszemle.hu/aktualis-szam/146-
allampenzugyi-muhely-nemzetgazdasagtan/917-kozpenzugyi-megujulas-es-allami-
modellvaltas-magyarorszagon
Lehmann, K. – Mátrai, R. – Pulai, Gy. (2013): Measures taken by the Federal Reserve System 
and the European Central Bank during the crisis. MNB Bulletin, Special Issue, October 
2013: 100–109.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2015): The Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s Self-Financing Programme, April 
2014–March 2015. Magyar Nemzeti Bank. http://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/the-magyar-
nemzeti-bank-s-self-financing-programme-april-2014-march-2015.pdf
Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2016): Mid-term Report 2013–2016. https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/
felidos-jelentes-2013-2016-eng-0623.pdf
41
The Hungarian Model: Hungarian Crisis Management in View of the Mediterranean Way
Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2017): The Hungarian Way – Targeted Central Bank Policy. Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank Book Series, Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
Matolcsy, Gy. (2008): Éllovasból sereghajtó – Elveszett évek krónikája (From Vanguard to 
Bringing Up the Rear – A Chronicle of Lost Years). Éghajlat Könyvkiadó Kft., Budapest.
Matolcsy, Gy. (2015): Economic Balance and Growth. Magyar Nemzeti Bank Book Series, 
Kairosz Könyvkiadó Kft.
Matolcsy, Gy. (2017): Tíz évvel a válság után 2007–2017 (Ten years after the crisis 2007–
2017). Presentation at the plenary session of the 2017 Annual Congress of Economists 
of the Hungarian Economic Association, 7 September. http://www.mkt.hu/wp-content/
uploads/2017/09/nyito_Matolcsy_Gyorgy.pdf 
Matolcsy, Gy. – Palotai, D. (2016): The interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in 
Hungary over the past decade and a half. Financial and Economic Review, 15(2): 5–32. 
http://english.hitelintezetiszemle.hu/letoltes/gyorgy-matolcsy-daniel-palotai-en.pdf 
Mosberger, P. (2017): Egykulcsos társasági adó hatása (The impact of a flat-rate corporate 
tax). Szakmai cikk (Article), MNB, https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/mosberger-palma-
egykulcsos-tarsasagi-ado-hatasa.pdf
Nagy, M. (2015): Forintosítás – hogy is volt ez? (Forint conversion – How did it exactly go?) 
Szakmai cikk (Article), MNB. https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/15-01-28-nagy-marton-istvan-
forintositas-hogy-is-volt-ez.pdf
Nagy, M. – Virág, B. (2017): Felzárkózás az eurozónában – csakis megfelelő felkészültséggel 
teljesíthető. (Convergence in the euro area – Achievable only with the appropriate 
preparation). Szakmai cikk (Article), MNB. https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/nagy-marton-
virag-barnabas-felzarkozasi-az-eurozonaban-frissitett.pdf
OECD (2010): Tax Policy reform and Economic Growth. OECD Tax Policy Studies 20. OECD 
Publishing, Paris.
OECD (2017): OECD Tax database. http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.
htm#VATTables 
Palotai, D. (2017): Beértek a 2010-2013 közötti adóreform kedvező hatásai (The favourable 
effects of the 2010–2013 tax reform have borne fruit). Szakmai cikk (Article), MNB. 
https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/palotai-daniel-adoreform-gyumolcsei-mnb-honlapra.pdf
Prammer, D. (2011): Quality of taxation and the crisis: tax shifts from a growth perspective. 
Taxation papers NO. 29, European Commission.
Sapir, A. (2016): The eurozone needs less heterogenity. Vox article, 12/01/2016. 
https://voxeu.org/article/eurozone-needs-less-heterogeneity 
42 Studies
György Matolcsy – Dániel Palotai
Sávai, M. – Kiss, G.D. (2017): Az államadósság mértékét meghatározó mutatók vizsgálata. 
A V4 és GIPS országcsoportok összehasonlító elemzése egylépéses dinamikus panelregresszió 
segítségével (Examination of Indicators Determining the Rate of Government Debt. 
Comparative Analysis of the V4 and GIPS Countries Using One-step Dynamic Panel 
Regression). Pénzügyi Szemle, 2017(4): 445–461. https://www.penzugyiszemle.hu/
documents/savaim-kissgd-2017-4-mpdf_20180110163634_5.pdf   
Szalai, Á. – Kolozsi, P.P. (2016): Mit kell tennünk egy versenyképesebb magyar gazdaságért? – 
Gondolatok a Magyar Nemzeti Bank Versenyképesség és növekedés című monográfiájával 
kapcsolatban (What Shall We Do for a More Competitive Hungarian Economy? – Thoughts 
About the Monograph Competitiveness and Growth of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank). Polgári 
Szemle, 12(4–6). 
Szoboszlai, M. – Bögöthy, Z. – Mosberger, P. – Berta, D. (2018): A 2010–2017 közötti adó- és 
transzferváltozások elemzése mikroszimulációs modellel (Analysis of the changes in the 
tax and transfer system in 2010–2017 using a microsimulation model). MNB Occasional 
Papers – 135., February. https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/mnb-tanulma-ny-135-vegleges.pdf
Trabandt, M. – Uhlig, H. (2012): How do Laffer curves differ across countries? WP No. 17862, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, February. http://www.nber.org/papers/w17862.pdf
